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Abstract
This paper examines the regulation of distribution system operators
(DSOs) focused the Czech electricity market. It presents an international
benchmarking study based on data of 15 regional DSOs including two Czech
operators. The study examines the application of yardstick methods using
data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
Based on our results, we find that the cost efficiency of each of the Czech
DSOs is different, which indicates a suitability of introduction of individual
efficiency factors in the regulatory process.
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1 Introduction
The electricity distribution sector in the Czech Republic is dominated by
three regional distribution system operators (DSOs). Their natural monopo-
listic structure creates a need for regulation. Czech Energy Regulation Office
(ERU) is applying incentive based revenue cap regulation, which is designed
to motivate the incumbents to improve efficiency of their operation. The
problem is that the firms are treated equally, regardless of the structure of
the network that they control. The regulator employs only the general X
factors that implicitly assume the firms to be similar. The equal treatment
of DSOs is, however, very simplistic and if there are differences in cost effi-
ciency among the operators, the less efficient operators are not incentivised
to converge to the more cost efficient operators.
Introduction of the individual efficiency factors is problematic due to
only three firms dominating the market. The comprehensive analysis of the
incumbents conducted to reveal their true cost efficiency is beyond the capa-
bilities of the regulator and given the size of the companies even impossible
to complete. ERU sought to introduce the individual efficiency factors, but
abandoned the idea because of the shortage of data (ERU, 2009). The compa-
nies can be compared with their competitors or with comparable companies;
however, as Pollitt (2005) notes, in reality it is difficult to find strictly compa-
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rable firms. Another option is to model an efficient frontier of the comparable
firms that serves as a yardstick (Kuosmanen et al., 2013). Given the Czech
market structure, the option might be benchmarking of gas and electricity
DSOs; however, there are significant differences between the sectors (storage,
impact of the crisis, network specifics, etc.) and these may prove to be very
difficult to control for. We believe that the suitable option, how to compute
the efficiency of the incumbents, is to conduct a benchmarking analysis using
the international dataset.
Our paper is based on articles published in the Energy Policy journal. We
draw inspiration from works of Michael Pollitt and his colleagues. Interna-
tional benchmarking study was conducted by Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) who
benchmarked 63 regional electricity distribution and transmission companies
using the DEA, SFA and COLS methods. The authors stressed the potential
of international benchmarking for regulators but they also mentioned the
obstacles. We see the problematic part in inclusion of both DSOs and TSOs
in the analysis because their operation is different. Haney and Pollitt (2009)
conducted a survey of 40 energy regulators and found out that benchmarking
techniques are widely used for the regulation of gas and electricity utilities.
They further sought the determinants of best practice regulation (Haney
and Pollitt, 2011) on the same sample of countries. The authors examined
the benchmarking practice of TSOs; they mentioned that the benchmarking
methods and frontier analyses substitute the complicated engineering models
of regulated methods and they also stressed that the TSOs are more difficult
to benchmark as they are more idiosyncratic and need to be benchmarked
internationally (Haney and Pollitt, 2013, p. 277). This also confirms our
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assumption that DSOs and TSOs should be benchmarked separately. Ku-
osmanen et al. (2013) focused on the best practice benchmarking of DSOs.
They compared DEA, SFA and StoNED (for more details, refer to Kuosma-
nen et al., 2013) methods. StoNED methods are employed by Finnish regula-
tor and combine advantages of DEA and SFA, however, they demand bigger
datasets. Both Michael Pollitt and Timo Kuosmanen worked for national
regulatory offices in England and Finland respectively, and they influenced
the development of benchmarking for regulation in both countries.
As was mentioned above, a similar benchmarking study in the Czech
Republic was not conducted yet. As far as we know, similar analysis was
not conducted for other European countries that we examine either (namely
Slovakia, Poland and Serbia). We follow papers that examined benchmark-
ing methods in particular states. Farsi et al. (2005 and 2006) examined
the panel of 59 Swiss distribution utilities using SFA estimated by gener-
alised least squares, maximum likelihood and random effects models. Their
analysis was facilitated by large dataset (around 380 observations) that sig-
nificantly exceeds other studies. Agrell and Bogetoft (2011) supervised the
final report on the use of benchmarking methods for the regulation of DSOs
prepared for the Belgian regulator. They examined both gas and electricity
DSOs and recommended DEA for the regulation. The general recommended
variables were TOTEX (input), and number of connections, lines length and
transformers (outputs).
The benchmarking studies are not only used in theoretical literature, but
are widely used in the regulatory practice. According to Bogetoft and Otto
(2011), there were nine European regulators that used benchmarking for the
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regulation of electricity DSOs. According to Schweinsberg et al. (2011),
regulators in 12 out of 27 EU members used methods of cost benchmarking
in energy regulation.
Our study complements the already conducted studies and brings analysis
of states that were outside of the field of interest of the researchers. We are,
unfortunately, not allowed to disclose the computed efficiency scores for for-
eign operators due to the contractual obligations; however, the international
dataset brings the efficiency comparison among the companies and allows us
to determine the efficiency scores for the Czech DSOs.
In the following sections, the yardstick methods used to measure the per-
formance of DSOs and collected data are described. We adopt the DEA and
SFA methods for benchmarking while taking into account the scope of the
data available. The methods widely applied to the regulation of electricity
markets are described and compared in the second section without formali-
sation. The thorough formalisation of all methods and yardstick techniques
(TFP, DEA, COLS, MOLS and SFA) would significantly exceed the recom-
mended scope of the paper. This section encompasses description of the
DEA and SFA methods and of the dataset. The purpose of the following
sections is to outline the methodology and data used for a computation of
the efficiency scores of DSOs.
2 Methodology
DSOs are traditionally subject to specific regulation. The regulators have
been changing the rate of return schemes to incentive regulation since 1990s.
The incentive regulation is usually complemented by yardstick methods to
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better fit the regulated decision making units (hereafter DMUs) and to mit-
igate the information asymmetry. The terms DMU and firm are taken as
interchangeable even though the firm may not be inappropriate for example
in the case of benchmarking the public service companies, but in context of
our study they are both relevant.
The most widely used techniques are the DEA methods combined with
the stochastic frontier methods or methods based on the OLS regressions. In
our study, the DEA models are preferred because of the limited scope of data
while both the constant and variable return to scale DEA models are applied.
In the literature, the DEA models are often complemented by a second stage
OLS regression of efficiency parameters to control for other environmental
characteristics that are typical of DSOs in the electricity sector. We checked
the CRS DEA results and regressed coefficients on population density and
the estimates confirmed the results of VRS DEA. Due to the size of dataset,
we decided to apply both the CRS and VRS DEA specifications without
second stage. The DEA models are supplemented with SFA, but we are
aware of the limitations stemming from the size of the dataset.
2.1 Techniques
2.1.1 Data envelopment analysis
DEA is a non-parametric method that use piecewise linear programming to
calculate the efficient surface (or frontier) over the data (Coelli et al., 2005).
The efficient DMUs lying on the frontier envelop the less efficient firms. The
efficiency of particular DMUs (firms) is calculated relative to the frontier on
a (0, 1〉 scale. The efficient DMU is scored one and the number indicates a
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point on the frontier.
The DEA models can be both input and output oriented. The input-
orientated DEA calculates how much the input quantities can be reduced
without changing the output values. The output-orientated programmes
how much the outputs can be expanded keeping the input quantities un-
changed. The input-orientated DEA is generally appropriate for benchmark-
ing of DSOs (e.g. Frontier Economics, 2012; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003);
moreover, the demand for distribution services is a derived demand, the in-
cumbents cannot influence it and it has to be met because of the regulation
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003). The models can be specified for constant or
variable returns to scale (CRS, VRS respectively).
Firstly, we define the CRS input-based model. We will follow notation
made by Coelli et al. (2005). Assume the dataset of N firms containing data
on K inputs and M outputs. They are represented by column vectors xi
and yi respectively. The input matrix X (K ×N) and the output matrix Y
(M ×N) represent the data for all firms.
For each firm, we would like to obtain the efficiency score that is the
maximum ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs for each DMU, such
as u′yi/v′xi where u is a vector of output weights (M × 1) and v is a vector
of input weights (K×1). The efficiency score in a multiple input and output











≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , N
u, v ≥ 0.
The linear programming is solved for each DMU while the efficiency score
must be less or equal to one. The problem of above mentioned programming
problem is that it has infinite number of solutions (Coelli et al., 2005). If
(u˜, v˜) are the solutions, then for a  R, (au˜, av˜) are solutions as well; therefore,
it is necessary to modify the model and impose a constraint of weighted inputs







s.t. v′xi = 1,
u′yj
v′xj
≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , N
u, v ≥ 0.
Coelli et al. (2005) suggest equivalent form of the (2) linear programming
problem that is also more convenient for our analysis. Using duality, it can





s.t. − yi + Y λ ≥ 1
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0,
where θ is a scalar (equal to efficient score) and λ represents a N × 1
vector of constants. The problem (3) satisfies the assumption of efficiency
score to be between zero and one while the DMU with θ = 1 is technically
efficient. To obtain the efficient score for each DMU, the linear programming
problem must be sold N times. In the model (3), the DMU i is compared
to linear combination of other firms in the sample. It is obvious from the
second condition that the output vector xi is minimised while still remaining
in the feasible set of inputs that is bounded by the piece-wise linear isoquant
determined by the firms included in the sample. The input vector xi is radi-
ally contracted on the isoquant (frontier) to the point (Xλ, Y λ). This point
is a linear combination of the observed data points and given the constraints
in the model (3), it is inside the feasible set.
The radial contraction of the input vector is invariant in units so the
efficiency score is not influenced by change of measurement units. Since we
assume only one cost input variable in our model, there can be identified
missing outputs after the proportional reduction in input. These exist only
for inefficient firms and represent only the leftover portion of inefficiencies
after the radial contraction and the slacks are necessary to move to firm to
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the efficient frontier (Ozcan, 2008).
The problem of CRS DEA is that implicitly assumes that the firms are op-
erating on the optimal scale. This assumption is violated in case of imperfect
competition, regulations and other factors that restrict the firms to operate
at optimal scale (Coelli et al., 2005). To get VRS DEA, the model (3) is
modified by adding a convexity constraint
∑
λ = 1. If the CRS specification
is applied to DMUs that are not operating on efficient scale, the technical
efficiency is influenced by scale efficiencies. VRS DEA calculates technical
efficiency less the scale efficiencies and the firms are compared against other




s.t. − yi + Y λ ≥ 1
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0
N1′λ = 1
λ ≥ 0,
where the N1 is a N × 1 vector of ones.
To find out the nature of the returns to scale, Coelli et al. (2005) recom-
mends non-increasing returns to scale specification (NIRS) where the restric-
tion N1′λ = 1 from (4) is replaced by restriction N1′λ ≤ 1. If the efficiency
scores from VRS and NIRS differ, the increasing returns to scale exist for the
particular firm. The NIRS restriction ensures that the firm is benchmarked
against firms of similar size and not substantially larger.
10
Using VRS DEA, the overall effect can be decomposed to technical ef-
ficiency and scale efficiency. Important advantage of DEA is that is does
not suffer from problems with multicollinearity, because it is based on linear
programming (Andor and Hesse, 2011; Went, 2007). Jensen (2005) showed
that multicollinearity has little impact even on the results of SFA.
There are several rules of setting the minimal amount of DMUs for DEA
to have good discriminatory power. The general rule of thumb is that the
minimum number of DMUs should be at least twice the sum of inputs and
outputs. Some authors recommend more prudent approaches - twice the
multiple of inputs and outputs, three times the number of inputs and outputs
and so forth (for more details, refer to Sarkis, 2007; or Cullinane and Wang,
2006).
2.1.2 Stochastic frontier analysis
In the previous section, we considered the non-parametric DEA to obtain
efficiency measures. In this section, parametric estimation using SFA is con-
sidered. The development of the SFA models is soundly described in the
literature (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005; Greene, 2007). The main advantage of
SFA compared to DEA is that it allows for statistical and functional form
testing and separates noise and inefficiency. SFA requires specification of
production (or cost) function requiring assumptions about production tech-
nologies of DMUs.
As well as the ordinary least squares methods, SFA requires specification
of the production function and shares many properties with regression tech-
niques, but it uses more sophisticated estimation of the production frontier.
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We will consider costs as dependent variable in model similarly to DEA. The
treatment of outputs and inputs will be therefore analogous.
DEA attributes the difference between the particular DMU and efficient
firm to inefficiency. The estimation of deterministic production frontier could
be conducted by methods based on OLS, but any deviation from determinis-
tic efficient frontier is again assigned to inefficiency; however, the deviations
might not be under control of the management and could be caused for ex-
ample by measurement error or other source of statistical noise (Coelli et al.,
2005). The stochastic frontier production function model was developed to
overcome these problems.
There are several different expressions of the technology of the indus-
try. The Cobb-Douglas and translog specifications are most frequently used
in empirical applications. The Cobb-Douglas form is more restrictive in as-
sumptions but usually preferred over translog specification for benchmarking
of DSOs with smaller samples. SFA is estimated using the maximum likeli-
hood estimation techniques.
We start with a model for cross-sectional data and follow notational sys-
tem from Coelli et al. (2005). The stochastic production function model was
simultaneously proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den
Broeck (1977) in form
ln qi = x
′
iβ + vi − ui, (5)
where qi is dependent variable of i-th firm (input in case of cost frontier);
xi is a K×1 vector of logarithms of explanatory variables (outputs in case of
cost frontier); β is a vector of unknown parameters; vi is a symmetric random
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error accounting for statistical noise; and ui is non-negative random variable
associated with inefficiency. The statistical noise is caused by measurement
error, omission of relevant variables and it can arise from approximation of
errors related to the functional form of the production (or cost) function.
The model is bounded from above by stochastic variable exp(x′iβ + vi) that
gives the model its name.
Let us further assume production function. The SFA frontier can be
illustrated graphically. Taking the Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier (5) of the
production function with single dependent (output) and single explanatory
(input) variables, we have
ln qi = β0 + β1 lnxi + vi − ui. (6)
If we rearrange the equation (6), we get
qi = exp(β0 + β1 lnxi)× exp(vi)× exp(−ui), (7)
where exp(β0 + β1 lnxi) is deterministic component; exp(vi) represents
noise; and exp(−ui) is inefficiency term. Assume the deterministic frontier
to reflect the decreasing returns to scale. Further assume two firms, firm
A and firm B. Firm A produces output qA using input xA, firm B uses xB
to produce qB. If the both firms are effective, i.e. there are no inefficiency
effects (uA = 0 ∧ uB = 0), the production functions are
q∗A ≡ exp(β0 + β1 lnxA + vA) ∧ q∗B ≡ exp(β0 + β1 lnxB + vB). (8)
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Further assume the noise effect for firm A to be positive (vA > 0) and
for firm B to be negative (vB < 0), and deterministic frontier qi = exp(β0 +
β1 lnxi).
The position of the firm with respect to the deterministic frontier depends
on the magnitudes of noise and inefficiency effects.
Most of the frontier analyses are aimed at prediction of inefficiencies. The





The value of technical efficiency is between zero and one and it represents
the ratio of the company’s output to the output that could be produced by
fully efficient firm using the same vector of inputs. A drawback of SFA is
that even if there are no statistical errors, some may be wrongly regarded as
noise (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003).
The estimation of the SFA parameters is more complicated due to two
random terms included in the right hand side of the equation (5); there-
fore, some assumption concerning these terms should be made. Assume vi
are random variables that are assumed to be independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d), vi ∼ N(0, σ2v) and independent of ui; ui are non-negative
random variables assumed to be i.i.d, ui ∼ |N(0, σ2u)| (Coelli, 1996b). Aigner
et al. (1977) obtained maximum likelihood estimators under these assump-
tions and parameterised the log-likelihood function for half-normal model.







for σ2v ≥ 0. There are no inefficiency
effects if λ2 = 0 and the deviations from frontier are due to statistical noise.
For details of this parameterisation, refer to Coelli et al. (2005).
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The ui is homoscedastic with constant mean and uncorrelated; the vi is
homoscedastic, with zero mean and uncorrelated (similar properties to the
noise of the classical linear regression model). The OLS model cannot be
used for estimation, because the intercept is biased downwards. Coelli et al.
(2005) suggest the use of maximum likelihood method for better asymptotic
properties in comparison with adjusted OLS models (e.g. COLS, MOLS).
The general model (5) from Aigner et al. (1977) can be extended to panel
data. The model is expressed as (Battese and Coelli, 1992)
ln qi,t = x
′
i,tβ + vi,t − ui,t, (10)
where time factor t is added. Statistical noise is assumed to be i.i.d,
vi ∼ N(0, σ2v) and independent of inefficiency term. The inefficiency term
may vary over time
ui,t = ui exp[−η(t− T )], (11)
where ui are random non-negative variables assumed to be i.i.d. as trun-
cations at zero of N(µ, σ2u) distribution; η parameter to be estimated; and
the panel dataset does not have to be balanced.





u) that represents the share of technical efficiency in error term. If
γ = 0, all deviations from the frontier are attributed to statistical noise; on
the other hand if γ = 1, all deviations are caused by inefficiency. For more
details, refer to Battese and Corra (1977), Battese and Coelli (1992), Coelli
(1996a), Coelli (1996b) and Coelli et al. (2005).
Since a cost function is considered in our study (dependent variable is
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total expenditures), the equation (10) is adjusted (Coelli, 1996b)
ln qi,t = x
′
i,tβ + vi,t + ui,t, (12)
all other factors keeping the same. In case the cost function in equation
(12) is considered, the ui,t term defines the cost inefficiency of the firm, i.e.
the distance of the firm from the cost frontier. Some authors recommend
translog form for cost function specification (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005; Agrell
and Bogetoft, 2011). We considered the option, but due to the limited dataset
and loss of degrees of freedom, we applied log-linear functional form. In case
of larger dataset, we would test both options and compare results.
2.2 Data description
Our benchmarking study is based on data of the electricity DSOs. We focus
on the unbundled regional DSOs with more than 100,000 customers. The
inclusion of smaller DSOs would increase the size of the dataset, but the
differences would have significant impact on the computed efficiency scores.
We complemented the Czech DSOs with companies from other European
countries.
The collection of data was complicated due to their confidentiality. There
were problems with provision of both financial (cost data) and technical data.
We contacted national regulatory authorities and communicated with the
Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators and the Council of European
Energy Regulators, but we were only referred to annual reports and to par-
ticular firms. Due to the confidentiality, we could not have been allegedly
provided with the data; therefore, we directly contacted particular compa-
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nies. The financial statements are publicly accessible in the Czech Republic,
but it is very uncommon in the international comparison. Sometimes con-
solidated data for particular energy groups are available, but they do not
include detailed data. During the data collection, we had to sign several con-
tracts and declarations on oath and we had to pledge to anonymise the data.
Thus we cannot mention companies’ names and we can only state descriptive
statistics of the dataset.
We obtained data of 15 DSOs from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland,
Hungary and Serbia. The data are from financial statements, annual reports,
reports to the regulatory authorities, websites and mostly supplemented by
data provided directly by the companies. All companies are unbundled and
operating on the regional basis. We sought data from the Austrian DSOs and
contacted all 11 DSOs distributing energy to more than 100,000 customers,
but none of them provided us demanded data.
The only data we were able to obtain directly without help were the
data of Czech DSOs. There are three regional DSOs in the Czech Republic,
but we can use only two of them for our study, because the company E.On
Distribuce, a.s. did not provide us with financial data that would be usable
for our analysis. The published financial statements are consolidated for
distribution of both gas and electricity and it was no possible to obtain the
separated cost data; therefore, only CˇEZ Distribuce, a.s. and PREdistribuce,
a.s. are included. We obtained the data from annual reports, distribution
quality reports and websites. The data and documents are available online
at websites of the companies.
Selection of inputs and outputs is based on theoretical literature (e.g.
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Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; Haney and Pollitt, 2009; Kuosmanen et al., 2013;
Shuttleworth, 2005) and practical application (e.g. EY, 2013; Frontier Eco-
nomics, 2010; Frontier Economics, 2012; Schweinsberg et al., 2011).
The data are analysed using two methods, therefore, they are adjusted
accordingly. For DEA, cross-sectional data for 2012 are used. We sought
most up to date data and endeavour to obtain complete dataset of 2012.
Data of some firms we were able to obtain from 2010 to 2012 and the panel
is used for SFA. The balanced panel is not necessary for SFA and we utilise
this characteristic.
The inputs (costs) are represented in monetary values. They are adjusted
for inflation using annual growth rate and denominated in euro with 2012 as
a base year. The exchange rates were used as at the end of individual years,
because the costs were taken mostly from financial statements that consider
exchange rate at the year end.
The summary statistics over the data are depicted in Table 1. The data
are rounded to comply with the rules of DSOs and to guarantee anonymi-
sation. To anonymise the data, values for minimum, maximum and median
are rounded to the nearest ten. Most of the minimum values have to be
anonymised with designation “N/A”, because the minimum values would be
attributable to single company. We are aware of the low information value,
but we are limited by the signed contracts and declarations on oath.
The efficiency scores are estimated using software developed by Timothy
Coelli. For DEA, version 2.1 of software DEAP (Coelli, 1996a) and for SFA,
version 4.1 of software Frontier (Coelli, 1996b) are used.
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Table 1: Summary statistics over dataset
Variable Minimum Maximum Median Mean
TOTEX (’000 000 EUR) N/A 10 0 0.532
Distributed energy in TWh N/A 50 10 12.280
Number of customers (’000 000) N/A 10 0 1.552
Service area (’000 sq. km) N/A 80 20 26.048
Grid length (’000 km) 10 220 30 67.298
HV lines (’000 km) 10 150 20 42.668
MV lines (’000 km) N/A 70 10 22.030
LV lines (’000 km) N/A 10 0 2.609
Underground cables (’000 km) N/A 70 10 20.085
Overhead lines (’000 km) N/A 160 30 47.212
Number of transformers N/A 60 10 20.527
SAIFI 40 1 800 350 503.328
SAIDI N/A 20 0 5.661
2.2.1 Input variables
DEA can be used for estimation of multiple inputs and outputs while SFA
requires specification of the cost function (or production function) with single
dependent variable. The single input model utilises comparability of the
results of both methods.
We use input variable (dependent variable in case of SFA) in monetary
terms in form of total expenditures (TOTEX). We obtained capital expen-
ditures, however, the investments in distribution networks are cyclical and
given the scope of analysis (panel data for SFA), the use of CAPEX would
require long panel data or adjustments. Therefore, we prefer total costs to
be benchmarked.
The costs are converted from national currencies to euro. Jamasb and Pol-
litt (2003) converted their costs using purchasing power parities to equalise
the price differences among countries. We decided to transform the data
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using only the exchange rates, because the capital expenditures comprise
mostly of materials traded in euro and the direct labour costs form a minor
share of TOTEX of the utilities. We do not consider the transformation
using purchasing power parity to be convenient. In other studies, we did not
observe similar adjustments.
In some of the models, the total costs are weighted by distributed energy
and represents costs of unit of distributed energy.
2.2.2 Output variables
Our models are based on the output (dependent) variables we obtained. The
selection is based on the literature and practice of regulators. We consider
these variables as major cost drivers. Except for quality parameters (SAIFI
and SAIDI), the parameters are assumed to be non-discretionary or to limited
extent manageable by the incumbents. The output variables are
• distributed energy in MWh,
• number of clients (grid connection points),
• service area (sq. km),
• grid length (area),
• low voltage lines (km);
• medium voltage lines (km);
• high voltage lines (km);
• length of underground cables (km);
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• length of overhead lines (km),
• number of transformers,
• quality parameters - SAIDI, SAIFI.
These are the general variables used for estimation. The specifications of
models based on these data are described in the following sections.
2.3 Estimated models
2.3.1 Estimated DEA models
The input (dependent) variable of all models is represented by total ex-
penditures. The explanatory (output) variables differ. For DEA, we use
four output variables for analyses and consider methods with both CRS and
VRS. We use a mean normalisation of data to correct for imbalances in data
magnitudes. The normalisation is recommended by Sarkis (2007) to address
possible scaling effects of the software. The DEAP does not indicate any
problems, but we decided to normalise the data for the sake of accuracy.







where A¯i is the mean for i-th output or input; N is a number of DMUs;
and Ani is a value of particular input (output) of n-th DMU.
The outputs for first DEA model (DEA1) are:
• (1) area (sq. km),
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• (2) grid length (km) weighted by distributed energy (MWh),
• (3) transformers (count) weighted by distributed energy (MWh),
• and (4) inverse value of interruption duration (min) per MWh.
The interruption duration is computed from the SAIDI coefficient, which is
multiplied by number of customers and weighted by distributed energy. The
value is inverted, because the lower the interruption duration is, the more
costly the grid maintenance is assumed to be. The weighting of parameters
is used to address to multicollinearity of output variables. As mentioned
above, multicollinearity is not a problem for DEA, but high correlations
among variables may decrease the descriptive power. The weighting is also
preferred in the practical usage of DEA (e.g. benchmarking of DSOs in
Norway).
For the second DEA model (DEA2), the outputs are
• (1) area of the distribution network (sq. km)
• (2) grid length (km) weighted by distributed energy (MWh)
• (3) transformers (count) weighted by distributed energy (MWh),
• and (4) share of underground cables (%).
The interruption duration parameter is replaced by percentage share of un-
derground network that is generally considered to be more costly to maintain
and thus we decided to include it.
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2.3.2 Estimated stochastic frontier models
In regulatory practice, the parameters used for SFA are similar to DEA and
both methods are compared. We estimate three models. Two of them are
using similar variables as our DEA model.
We use unbalanced panel specification of the SFA cost model. We use
a log-linear model specification. This specification employs a Cobb-Douglas
cost functional form and it is linear in log of the variables. The log-linear
model specification for SFA1 is
lnTOTEXi,t = β0 + β1 lnAREAi,t + β2NETWi,t (14)
+ β3TRAN i,t + β4INTEi,t + ui,t + vi,t,
where dependent variable TOTEX are total expenditures expressed in euro
weighted by distributed energy; explanatory variables (AREA, NETW ,
TRAN and INTE) are similar to outputs in DEA1; u is inefficiency term;
v is noise term; βs are unknown parameters to be estimated; i {1, .., 15} is
the coefficient for particular companies; and t {1, 2, 3} is a time parameter
for 2010-2012 years. The variable for interruptions is not inverted, because
inversion is not necessary in case of SFA. The variables are not weighted by
MWh as in the case of DEA, because the values must be greater than one due
to the logarithmic form. For SFA, the data were scaled by 10 TWh instead
of GWh of delivered energy.
The SFA2 is specified similarly, only variable for interruption duration
is replaced by the share of cable lines (CABL).
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The third SFA model, SFA3, we defined as unweighted. We are aware
of the high correlation coefficient between distributed energy and number of
transformers (0.87); however, Jensen (2005) showed that multicollinearity has
little impact even on results of SFA and therefore we decided to include also
unscaled model. The selection of explanatory variables was based similarly
to previous models on regulatory practice. The model is defined
lnTOTEXui,t = β0 + β1 lnDIST + β2CABL (15)
+ β3TRAN
u
i,t + ui,t + vi,t,
where dependent variable TOTEXu represents unscaled total costs; ex-
planatory variables are DIST (represent distributed energy), CABL (al-
ready defined cables’ share), and TRANu (unscaled number of transformers)
other variables keeping similar to two previous models.
An important advantage of SFA is the possibility of statistical testing.
The significance of estimated parameters (βs) can be tested comparing the
computed t-statistics with critical values from ordinary statistical tables.
In addition to testing of the parameters of cost function, the existence of
inefficiency effects can be tested. SFA requires a priori assumption about
the distribution of inefficiency term. There two options, either to conduct
simple z-test or likelihood-ratio test (LR test). Coelli et al. (2005) suggest
using of one sided LR test, because the z-test has a poor performance for
small samples. The Frontier automatically gives values of one-sided likelihood
ratio test. The null hypopaper is inexistence of inefficiency effects, i.e. H0 :
λ = 0 for the half-normal model and H0 : µ = σ
2
u = 0 for the truncated-
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normal model. The statistic value of the LR test of the half-normal model
is to be compared with χ21−2α(x) distribution where α is a level of statistical
significance and x refers to number of restrictions. The critical value for the
truncated-normal model can be obtained from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm
(1986).
The appropriateness of the truncated-normal model over the half-normal
model can be also tested using values computed by the Frontier. The LR
test statistic is
λ = −2 [lnL(H0)− lnL(H1)] , (16)
where lnL(H0) and lnL(H1) are statistics for log-likelihood values re-
ported for half-normal and truncated-normal models. The null is H0 : µ = 0
against alternative H1 : µ 6= 0. The value of the test statistic (16) is to
be compared with χ21−α(x) where α is a level of statistical significance and x
refers to number of iterations of half-normal model.
3 Results
This section presents the results of the models described in the previous
section. In the first section, the results of the DEA models are discussed.
Subsequently, the results of the SFA models are presented and the assump-
tions of the SFA models are tested. In third section, the summary statistics
of efficiency scores are presented. The section is concluded with evaluation
of the models and policy implications.
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3.1 DEA models
As described in the previous section, there are two specifications of the DEA
models to be tested. We apply input-based VRS specification of the models
while DEAP presents also efficiency scores for the CRS specification. The
DEAP in addition computes values for NIRS DEA to compute the nature of
the returns to scale. The technical efficiency scores are depicted in Table 2,
which contains values of both DEA models and encompasses the efficiency
scores for the CRS and VRS specifications, scale effects, and nature of the
returns to scale (abbreviation irs is for increasing returns to scale, drs for
decreasing returns to scale and dash for constant return to scale).
Given the CRS specification, we assume that the firms are operating
on the same scale. Since the dataset is comprised of companies of diverse
size and from different countries, we consider the VRS specification to be
more appropriate. If we use the CRS model, the technical efficiency scores
might be confounded by scale efficiencies. The scale efficiency is defined by
computing both CRS and VRS models, and then decomposing the efficiency
scores obtained by CRS DEA to scale and pure technical inefficiency. If
the efficiency scores obtained from the CRS and VRS models differ, then it
indicates the existence of scale inefficiency. The technical efficiency score of
the CRS specification is equal to multiple of the VRS efficiency score and
scale efficiency score.
In case of the CRS DEA models, there are three and two firms lying on the
frontier. The lowest efficiency score is equal to 0.201 and 0.239 respectively.
The values indicate significant differences among the firms. For the VRS
DEA models, the number of firms on the frontier increases in both cases
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Table 2: Summary of DEA efficiency scores
DEA1 DEA2
Firm CRS VRS Scale RtS CRS VRS Scale RtS
1 0.356 0.429 0.831 irs 0.422 0.446 0.947 irs
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 0.642 1.000 0.642 drs
3 0.241 0.319 0.757 irs 0.241 0.319 0.757 irs
4 0.378 0.413 0.915 irs 0.239 0.362 0.658 irs
5 0.281 0.454 0.619 irs 0.299 0.454 0.658 irs
6 0.747 0.906 0.825 irs 0.834 0.926 0.900 irs
7 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 1.000 -
8 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 1.000 -
9 0.721 1.000 0.721 drs 0.800 1.000 0.800 drs
10 0.207 0.430 0.483 irs 0.264 0.430 0.615 irs
11 0.386 1.000 0.386 drs 0.386 1.000 0.386 drs
12 0.300 0.366 0.820 irs 0.300 0.366 0.820 irs
13 0.201 0.415 0.484 irs 0.293 0.440 0.666 irs
14 0.315 0.386 0.815 irs 0.315 0.386 0.815 irs
15 0.622 0.910 0.684 irs 0.828 0.953 0.869 irs
mean 0.517 0.669 0.756 - 0.524 0.672 0.769 -
to five and the mean efficiency increases in both cases. Most of the firms
exhibit non-constant returns to scale, but there are still significant differences
among the benchmarked firms. The problem of VRS specification is that the
validity depends on the size of the sample and VRS DEA tends to overstate
the efficiency scores (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003). The various categories of
the firms should be sufficiently represented in the sample that is, however,
limited in our case due to the small sample of firms.
Both DEA models give similar results. The validity can be increased by
the larger dataset, because different categories of the firms would be better
represented and thus the validity of VRS DEA would increase, but the data
gathering is very complicated as was described in the previous sections.
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3.2 SFA models
The SFA models are computed using programme Frontier. All the SFA
models are defined in Cobb-Douglas log-linear specification and modelled as
cost functions. The dataset in unbalanced for 15 firms with 28 observations.
Both truncated-normal and half normal distributions of the inefficiency term
are considered and tested. Summary statistics are reported in Table 3 for
the half-normal and Table 4 for the truncated-normal models. The values
of estimated coefficients are reported in columns while in parentheses the t-
statistics are depicted. The level of significance of the estimates is represented
by stars in parentheses. For LR test, the number of restrictions is depicted
in parentheses. The nature of the variables is described in previous section
in detail.
Table 3: Summary of SFA parameters with half-normal distribution of inef-
ficiency term
SFA1 (H-N) SFA2 (H-N) SFA3 (H-N)
Variable Coefficients (t-statistics)
Intercept 7.956 (3.544***) 10.954 (12.499***) -0.555 (-0.308)
AREA -0.076 (0.972) -0.109 (1.862*) -
NETW -0.224 (-0.763) -0.468 (-1.916*) -
TRAN 0.130 (0.509) 0.059 (0.279) -
INTE -0.194 (-0.929) - -
CABL - -0.715 (-6.188***) -0.378 (-3.478***)
DIST - - 1.132 (5.262***)
TRANU - - -0.386 (-2.222**)
σ2 0.334 (1.710*) 0.116 (1.937*) 0.159 (2.206**)
γ 0.948 (18.368***) 0.852 (7.445***) 0.907 (15.533***)
Statistics Values
Log-likelihood -0.824 5.869 5.427
LR one-sided test 7.222 (1 res.) 5.880 (1 res.) 11.971 (1 res.)
Statistical significance: * refers to 10%, ** refers to 5%, and *** refers to 1% significance.
The SFA1 specification shows poor statistical results. None of the vari-
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ables is significant at the 10% level. The value of γ indicates that 95% of the
variation in error term is attributable to technical efficiency and only 5% to
statistical noise. In the SFA2 model, two coefficients are weakly significant at
the 10% level of significance, one is significant at the 1% level and remaining
coefficient at variable TRAN is not statistically significant at the 10% level.
The second model exhibits lowest variance and only 15% of the variation in
error term is attributable to noise. In the third model, all coefficients are
significant at least at the 5% level. The model has lower variance than model
SFA1 and around 9% of the error term is attributable to statistical noise. To
test the existence of inefficiency effects with H0 : λ = 0, the values of LR test
are compared with χ20.9(1) = 2.706. Since the values reported for the models
exceed the critical value, we can reject the null hypopaper of no inefficiency
effects at the 5% level of significance.
The specification of truncated-normal distribution of inefficiency term
brings similar results. The SFA1 specification shows poor statistical results.
None of the variables is significant at the 10% level. The value of γ indicates
that 86% of the variation in error term is attributable to technical efficiency.
The SFA1 model has the lowest variance. The SFA2 model brings slightly
better results, one coefficient is weakly significant at the 10% level of signif-
icance, one is significant at the 5% level, one at the 1% level and remaining
coefficient at variable TRAN is not statistically significant at the 10% level.
Only 6% of the variation in error term is attributable to noise at the SFA2.
In the third model, all coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level.
The model has highest variance and only 3% of the variation in error term
is attributable to statistical noise.
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Table 4: Summary of SFA parameters with truncated-normal distribution of
inefficiency term
SFA1 (T-N) SFA2 (T-N) SFA3 (T-N)
Variable Estimated parameters (t-statistics)
Intercept 7.313 (4.216***) 11.200 (12.719***) -0.519 (-0.330)
AREA -0.091 (-1.156) -0.107 (-1.903*) -
NETW -0.093 (-0.348) -0.516 (2.111**) -
TRAN 0.772 (0.282) 0.079 (0.376) -
INTE -0.147 (-0.959) - -
CABL - -0.742 (-6.531***) 1.150 (6.092***)
DIST - - -0.384 (-3.845***)
TRANU - - -0.414 (-2.688**)
σ2 0.117 (1.945*) 0.317 (0.247) 0.503 (0.726)
γ 0.862 (7949***) 0.944 (4.224***) 0.970 (2.050**)
µ 0.629 (2.460**) -1.035 (-0.159) -1.397 (0.544)
Statistics Values
Log-likelihood 0.630 5.955 5.559
LR one-sided test 10.123 (2 res.) 6.050 (2 res.) 12.235 (2 res.)
Statistical significance: * refers to 10%, ** refers to 5%, and *** refers to 1% significance.
The negative signs of estimates and high coefficients at intercepts may
seem to be difficult to interpret. Initially, we were surprised with the signs,
but the results are in line with previous research (e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt,
2003). The negative signs can be interpreted by scale effects and increasing
returns to scale. The high values of γ indicates that most of the error term
is attributable to inefficiency. The low values would indicate wrong specifi-
cation of the model and on the contrary very high values approaching 100%
would need to be cautiously treated, because absence of noise is not likely to
occur especially in the cross-country comparison.
The existence of inefficiency effects is tested in different way compared
to the half-normal model. The null hypopaper is inexistence of inefficiency
effects in the model specification, i.e. H0 : µ = σ
2
u = 0 (Coelli et al., 2005).
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The values of LR test are compared with critical values obtained from Table 1
in Kodde and Palm (1986). Taking the 5% level of significance, the critical
value is equal to 5.138. The reported values exceed the critical value thus we
can reject the null at the 5% level of significance.
In the last step, we test the appropriateness of the use of the truncated-
normal over the half-normal distribution of the inefficiency term. The test
statistic is defined in expression (16). The null hypopaper is that the half-
normal model is adequate, H0 : µ = 0, against alternative H1 : µ 6= 0. The
computed statistics of the test give
• λSFA1 = −2[7.222− 10.123] = 5.802,
• λSFA2 = −2[5.880− 6.050] = 0.34,
• λSFA23 = −2[11.971− 12.235] = 0.528,
and the critical value at the 5% level of significance is χ20.95(1) = 3.841;
therefore, we have to reject the null in case of first model and we cannot
reject the null for SFA2 and SFA3 at the 5% level of significance.
Due to the statistically insignificant parameters, we do not include the
model SFA1 in our comparison. None of the parameters was significant that
indicates inappropriate specification. The results from remaining models
are better and we include them in our analysis. The models SFA2 and
SFA3 are included in their half-normal specification, because we rejected the
adequacy of truncated-normal distribution of inefficiency term at the 5% level
of significance. The values are depicted in Table 5.
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Table 5: Summary of SFA cost efficiency estimates
SFA2 (H-N) SFA3 (H-N)

















3.3 Summary of results
In this section, results from preferred models are described and summarised.
The results are depicted in Table 6. We include the CRS and VRS efficiency
scores obtained by both the DEA models and efficiency scores of the SFA2
and SFA3 models. The SFA models are specified with half-normal distribu-
tion of inefficiency term.
The results significantly differ across the firms. As we can see, the mean
efficiency is in interval from 52% (CRS DEA1) to 76% (SFA2). The diversity
in results is not exceptional in comparison with other studies and practice.
For example, the efficiency scores computed by the German regulator expe-
rienced similar variation. It ranged between 45% and 77% with lower values
for DEA and higher for SFA (Frontier Economics, 2012). The variation of
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results is caused by differences in nature of the methods.
In the regulatory benchmarking practice, the results from different meth-
ods are considered. The results are usually weighted and final efficiency
scores are based on scaling. The weighted sum of efficiency scores helps to
deal with particularities of different models. In the current 2014-2018 regu-
latory period in Austria, the results from two DEAs and MOLS are scaled
and used.
The Austrian energy regulatory office employs CRS DEA. The CRS speci-
fication is chosen under an assumption that possible scale inefficiencies would
be solved by mergers or joint ventures within the market (Frontier Economics,
2012). German regulator applies CRS DEA and SFA and takes into the ac-
count results from both methods; however, benchmarking in Austria and
Germany is based on the data of national DSOs and since our study is based
on international dataset, we believe that the VRS specification is also valid.
Considering the practice of regulators, we include both specifications in our
final comparison.
As the data of the Czech companies in the sample are publicly accessible,
we can reveal results for Czech DSOs included in the dataset. The company
1 is CˇEZ Distribuce, a.s. and company 2 PREdistribuce, a.s. Names of other
companies we are not allowed to disclose due to the contractual obligations.
The efficiency scores of CˇEZ Distribuce, a.s. are among the lowest in the
sample. The efficiency scores for PREdistribuce, a.s. are better and in
half of the results the company is lying on the frontier. The better results
could lead us to assign them to the different structure of the service area
of both operators; however, DSOs similar to both CˇEZ Distribuce, a.s. and
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Table 6: Summary of computed efficiency scores
CRS DEA1 VRS DEA1 CRS DEA2 VRS DEA2 SFA2 (H-N) SFA3 (H-N)
Firms Efficiency scores
1 0.356 0.429 0.422 0.446 0.476 0.400
2 1.000 1.000 0.642 1.000 0.596 0.583
3 0.241 0.319 0.241 0.319 0.752 0.586
4 0.378 0.413 0.239 0.362 0.724 0.800
5 0.281 0.454 0.299 0.454 0.731 0.800
6 0.747 0.906 0.834 0.926 0.916 0.863
7 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.907 0.881
8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.922 0.889
9 0.721 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.747 0.642
10 0.207 0.430 0.264 0.430 0.835 0.716
11 0.386 1.000 0.386 1.000 0.846 0.816
12 0.300 0.366 0.300 0.366 0.843 0.786
13 0.201 0.415 0.293 0.440 0.749 0.728
14 0.315 0.386 0.315 0.386 0.879 0.900
15 0.622 0.910 0.828 0.953 0.899 0.946
mean 0.517 0.669 0.524 0.672 0.764 0.720
PREdistribuce, a.s. are included in the sample. The efficiency scores of city
operators are on average similar to efficiency scores of DSOs operating larger
regions with lower population densities; therefore, the better performance of
PREdistribuce, a.s. cannot be simply attributable to the smaller area the
company is distributing the electrical energy on.
The SFA models indicate that the Czech DSOs are operating inefficiently,
or more precisely below an average efficiency. There can be other factors that
were omitted from our study, but the selection of variables is based both on
practical literature and regulatory practices for DSOs. We did not include
more variables to avoid an overspecification of our models. Although the
variation in results might seem very high, it is in line with previous research
(e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; EY, 2013).
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3.4 Policy implications
The energy sector in the Czech Republic can be considered as infant. There
are still discussions about the setting of the regulatory parameters. The
obstacles were shown during the discussion process preceding the fourth reg-
ulatory period of the regulation of gas sector in the Czech Republic. There
were problems with definitions of amortisation and depreciation, investments,
etc. There can be problems inherited from the past that can be beyond con-
trol of the managements. The current regulatory setting does not generate
sufficient incentives for development. In the current regulatory formula, the
quality and development parameters are not sufficiently emphasised. Addi-
tional parameters promoting development of the grid should be encompassed
in the regulation and also considered in the setting of benchmarking meth-
ods. DSOs should be more incentivised to invest in new technologies. The
development of smart grids, smart metering and more effective methods of
management of renewable energy sources in the Czech Republic should be
more accented in the future.
We are convinced that the use of international comparison would enable
thorough comparison and introduction of individual efficiency factors. Tak-
ing into account constraints stemming from the structure of the market, we
believe that the performance of incumbents should be assessed by interna-
tional benchmarking when the monopolistic domestic market structure with
only three companies operating the market restricts representativeness of the
majority of methods. Our model specification is very narrow with only hand-
ful of parameters, but this specification is in accordance with both theory
and foreign regulatory practice. Benchmarking is used for evaluation of rela-
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tive performance in comparison with peers and we consider it as an auxiliary
tool for regulation. We are aware of possible shortcomings of the methods
that are also endorsed by the use of international dataset.
Setting the efficient companies lying on the frontier (DEA), or the most
efficient companies (in case of SFA), as a yardstick would be too restrictive.
We would propose to set the objective efficiency value as a mean (or median)
efficiency score. Similar methodology is applied by the Norwegian regulator
(Frontier Economics, 2012). The companies operating above the mean (or
median respectively) are considered as effective and allocated only general
X factor. The companies operating below would be incentivised by the indi-
vidual X factors to improve efficiency of their performance. Another method
would be to set the floor similarly as the German regulator. If the company
is below some artificial value (in Germany 0.6), it would be treated as having
this minimum value.
We realise that international benchmarking is problematic. Similarly, the
size of our dataset confines the representativeness of our results. The use of
benchmarking would be the tool which suitability was proven in regulatory
practice if the Czech regulator seeks to set individual X factors in the future;
moreover, the Czech regulator is able to acquire the data of the EU regulated
companies and conduct comprehensive analysis with larger dataset. We were
informed by the representatives of ERU that the data are exchanged by the
EU regulators within the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators on
regular basis.
The company CˇEZ Distribuce, a.s. showed efficiency below an average in
all models we conducted and the results indicates inefficient operation. The
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company’s score was only in one case above median value. The company
PREdistribuce, a.s. obtained better scores and in three DEA models it was
a frontier firm, but in both SFA models it obtained efficiency scores below
mean and median. The Czech DSOs scored worse than comparable firms
from abroad that indicates improvement potential. There are only three
companies dominating the Czech market and the regulator can hardly dis-
pose of complete information about the firms. There is a risk of regulatory
capture. We mentioned all the regulatory constraints defined by Laffont and
Tirole (1996) and the political risk can also be an issue. The regulator is
established as independent, but two out of three incumbents are still con-
trolled by the state. The inefficient operation is indicated in international
comparison by fees for distribution included in the price of electricity. The
Slovak regulator conducted analysis of fees for electricity distribution in the
selected EU countries (URSO, 2011). The examined countries were Slovakia,
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Germany and Austria. The fee was
in the Czech Republic on average (average fee for all voltage lines) higher
than in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary and comparable with Austria. In Ger-
many, the average fee was highest due to the by far largest fee imposed on
the households to bear significant amount of cost that skewed the average
value.
In the third regulatory period, ERU was not able to set the individual X
factors for regulatory formula based on the revenue cap incentive scheme. We
are convinced that international benchmarking is a tool that would enable the
establishment of the individual X factors. The introduction of the individual
X factors without international comparison would demand thorough analysis
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of the incumbents and would be complicated due to the above mentioned
constraints the regulator has to always face. We showed in our analysis
that the efficiency between the Czech DSOs markedly differ and that their
operation is less efficient in comparison to foreign firms. The inclusion of only
general efficiency factor in the regulatory formula is therefore not sufficient to
improve their operation. We are aware of the fact that a more comprehensive
dataset is necessary for precise setting of the individual X factors and we
are aware of problems stemming from the limited size of the dataset we
used. The larger dataset would increase the descriptive power of our results,
however, the minimum criteria for DEA were fulfilled. Similarly, the more
comprehensive dataset would improve the results of SFA. We recommend
ERU to conduct similar benchmarking analysis with a larger dataset. The
results should be used for the adjustment of general X factor and primarily
to introduce the individual X factors that ERU was not able to incorporate
in regulatory formula of the current third regulatory period.
4 Conclusion
In our paper, we focused on the regulation of electricity sector in the Czech
Republic with main emphasis put on the implementation of benchmarking
methods for the distribution system operators. We utilised the benchmark-
ing studies focusing on electricity distribution companies and examine the
applicability of the benchmarking methods to DSOs in the Czech Republic.
We sought the data of foreign companies to complement the dataset. The
natural monopolistic market structure, the DSOs are inclining to, facilitates
the application of international benchmarking as the companies are usually
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controlling certain regions. Due to the liberalisation that was institution-
alised at the EU level, the companies also share similar structure as they
have to be unbundled from other activities.
Our main research question was to evaluate the use of benchmarking
methods for the regulation of DSOs. Benchmarking of the incumbents would
facilitate introduction of the individual X factors corresponding to efficiency
of particular incumbents. Similar analysis has not been conducted yet, as far
as we know.
We collected a dataset comprising of 15 unbundled companies from the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Serbia. The data gathering
was complicated due to confidentiality. We are not allowed to disclose the
data and the names of the foreign companies, however, it does not affect
representativeness of our paper as we sought to find the efficiency scores
for the Czech DSOs. The dataset comprises companies that are similar to
the Czech DSOs in terms of area and population served. The data of the
Czech companies are public and therefore we can present our results. We
were only able to use the data for CˇEZ Distribuce, a.s. and PREdistribuce,
a.s. The financial statements for E.On Distribuce, a.s. are consolidated for
distribution of electricity and gas and the company refused to provide us
with unconsolidated cost data.
For the empirical analysis, we applied both non-parametric and para-
metric efficiency measurement methods. The data envelopment analysis was
applied to cross-sectional data of the firms for 2012 in constant and variable
returns to scale specifications. The stochastic frontier analyses were based
on the unbalanced panel for 2010-2012 years. The data were adjusted for
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inflation using annual growth rate and denominated in euro with 2012 as a
base year. The total expenditures were taken as input (dependent variable)
and the outputs (dependent variables) were based on grid parameters and
outputs. The selection of parameters was based on theory and practical ex-
perience of regulators applying benchmarking of DSOs. The weighting of
outputs was applied to address high correlation among the output variables.
The results of our analysis showed significant differences among efficiency
scores of both Czech companies. The efficiency scores of CˇEZ Distribuce,
a.s. were below mean efficiency in all six models conducted while only in one
case the efficiency score was above median. The company PREdistribuce,
a.s. obtained higher scores. In case of three out of four DEA models, it
was a frontier firm; however, in SFA models the efficiency was below mean
and median. Our models confirmed varied efficiency of Czech DSOs that
should be addressed in the forthcoming fourth regulatory period. We believe
that individual efficiency factors should be implemented to control for these
differences.
Benchmarking serves as a suitable tool for assessment of the cost efficiency
of the Czech operators in international comparison. The results showed that
the Czech DSOs are in the international comparison among the less efficient
companies. This fact is in line with a study of the Slovak regulatory office,
which compared fees for the distribution included in the electricity price was
final customers. URSO (2011b) showed that the fee was in the Czech republic
on average higher than in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland and comparable with
Austria.
We are aware of the limitations stemming from the size of the dataset.
40
A larger dataset would improve the robustness of the frontier methods. As
the regulator can acquire more data within the Agency for Cooperation of
Energy Regulators, we recommend the Czech regulator, based on our anal-
ysis, to include the benchmarking methods in the setting of parameters for
the forthcoming fourth regulatory period. Our results indicated that the
efficiency scores differ for the Czech DSOs and their efficiency is worse in
comparison with their foreign peers. Benchmarking would enable setting
of individual X factors and modifications of the general X factor to better
correspond to the current market situation. We showed that the shortage
of national data, which restrained the adoption of benchmarking, can be
overcome by the use of international firms.
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